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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 200.40(1): Confessions must be substantially similar as to
their content, regardless of their reliability, in order to be found
interlocking so as to defeat a motion for severance in a criminal
proceeding
Section 200.40 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law' permits two or more defendants to be jointly charged 2 in a single indictment, but allows the court, in its discretion,3 to order separate
I CPL § 200.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Section 200.40(1) provides in pertinent
part:
1. Two or more defendants may be jointly charged in a single indictment provided
that:
(a) all such defendants are jointly charged with every offense alleged therein;
or
(b) all the offenses charged are based upon a common scheme or plan; or
(c) all the offenses charged are based upon the same criminal transaction
Even in such case, the court, upon motion of a defendant or the people...
may for good cause shown order in its discretion that any defendant be tried separately from the other or from one or more or all of the others. Good cause shall
include, but not be limited to, a finding that a defendant or the people will be
unduly prejudiced by a joint trial.. . . Upon such a finding of prejudice, the court
may order counts to be tried separately, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
Id. This provision was derived from § 391 of the 1881 Code of Criminal Procedure as
amended in 1926 which reinstated the common law rule. See CPL § 200.40, commentary at
440 (McKinney 1982). The 1926 provision read: "[d]efendants, jointly indicted, may be tried
separately or jointly in the discretion of the court." Ch. 461, § 391, [1926] N.Y. Laws 810.
2 See CPL § 200.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Policy considerations weigh in favor of
joint trials as they reduce the witnesses' onerous tasks of appearing in multiple suits and
promote prosecutorial and judicial economy. See id. commentary at 82-83. Indeed the trend
indicates a strong presumption that "defendants joined together should be tried together".
Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: an Analysis of Efficiencies and
Prejudices, 77 MIcH. L. Rav. 1379, 1381 (1978-79). However, this policy must be balanced
against a defendant's substantive fights so that he is not denied a fair trial. See People v.
Rowley, 119 Misc. 2d 86, 87, 462 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings County 1983).
3 CPL § 200.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986). See People v. La Belle, 18 N.Y.2d 405, 409,
222 N.E.2d 727, 729, 276 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (1966); People v. Ward, 107 App. Div. 2d 892,
895, 483 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (3d Dep't 1985) (mem.); People v. Rodriguez, 91 App. Div. 2d
591, 592, 457 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269 (1st Dep't 1982). When exercising its discretion, the court
must consider whether: "a separate trial will 'impede or assist the proper administration of
justice in a particular case and secure to the accused the right of a fair trial'." La Belle, 18
N.Y.2d at 411, 222 N.E.2d at 730, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (quoting People v. Snyder, 246 N.Y.
491, 496, 159 N.E. 408, 410 (1927)); see People v. Donovan, 53 App. Div. 2d 27, 30, 385
N.Y.S.2d 385, 387 (3d Dep't 1976). Generally, an appellate court will not substitute its discretion for the trial court's. See People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 424, 159 N.E. 379, 385
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proceedings when justice so requires. 4 When a defendant in a joint
trial has made an extrajudicial confession, it may be entered in evidence against him5 but, since it constitutes impermissible hearsay
against the other defendant, the court is required to instruct the
jury to use the inculpatory statement only against the declarant6
Separate trials are constitutionally mandated, however, when a codefendant's extrajudicial confession implicating the defendant is to
be introduced in evidence, and the codefendant does not intend to
testify.7 The Supreme Court has held that in such a situation, the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 8 is impaired
(1927); People v. Schwarz, 10 App. Div. 2d 17, 20, 196 N.Y.S.2d 472, 475 (1st Dep't 1960).
The trial court's discretion, however, is not absolute, see People v. Payne, 35 N.Y.2d 22, 26,
315 N.E.2d 762, 764, 358 N.Y.S.2d 701, 705 (1974); People v. Valdez, 97 App. Div. 2d 778,
778, 468 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188 (2d Dep't 1983) (mem.), and may be overturned if abused. See
People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 87, 305 N.E.2d 461, 467, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 378 (1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); La Belle, 18 N.Y.2d at 409, 222 N.E.2d at 729, 276
N.Y.S.2d at 108. Even if prejudice is not apparent at the outset of a case, an appellate court
may review a lower court's determination if substantial rights were in fact abrogated. See
People v. Burrelle, 21 N.Y.2d 265, 270, 234 N.E.2d 431, 432, 287 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (1967)
(quoting People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 427, 164 N.E. 336, 339 (1928)).
4 See CPL § 200.40(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986). The court may order separate trials
upon motion of a defendant or the people. See id. The motion for severance must be made
before the trial, see People v. Downs, 77 App. Div. 2d 740, 742, 431 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (3d
Dep't 1980) (mem.), within the period set forth by section 255.20. See CPL § 255.20(1)
(McKinney 1982). Section 255.20(1) provides in pertinent part: "all pretrial motions shall be
served or filed within forty five days after arraignment and before commencement of trial,
or within such additional time as the court may fix upon application of the defendant made
prior to entry of judgment." Id. The court, however, "in the interest of justice, and for good
cause shown, may, in its discretion, at any time before sentence, entertain and dispose of the
motion on the merits." CPL § 255.20(3) (McKinney 1982); see People v. Lowry, 8 App. Div.
2d 956, 957, 190 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.). However, if the issue of severance is not raised at or before trial, it may not be the basis for an appeal. See CPL §
470.05(2) (McKinney 1983).
Severances are provided for in the statute in recognition of the real possibility of
prejudice to a party to a joint proceeding. See CPL § 200.40, commentary at 437 (McKinney
1982). See also infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (right of confrontation); supra note
2, (policy reasons supporting joint trials). See generally People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 93, 238
N.E.2d 715, 291 N.Y.S.2d 313, (1968) (prejudicial error to force codefendant to claim privilege against self incrimination; severance should have been granted upon showing of need to
call codefendant); People v. Carter, 86 App. Div. 2d 451, 450 N.Y.S.2d 203, (2d Dep't 1982)
(severance mandated because defendant unfairly prejudiced codefendant).
See RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 231 (J. Prince 10th ed. 1973). An extrajudicial confession is an admission and as such it is a true exception to the hearsay rule. See id.
6 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 152 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 5, at § 232.
7 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); infra note 10.
a See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth amendment of the Constitution provides: "[in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
... Id. This right is primarily secured by affording a defendant the
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because the defendant is deprived of his right to cross examine his
codefendant 9 while a "substantial risk" exists that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, will consider the extrajudicial confession of the codefendant in assessing the guilt of the defendant.10
This constitutional restriction does not arise, however, when both
defendants make confessions which "interlock"." Recently in Peoopportunity to cross-examine witnesses. See Delaney, Sixth Amendment Issues at Trial,
Twelfth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure:United States Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals 1981-1982, 71 GEo. L.J. 663, 664 (1982). The confrontation clause is not merely a
rule of procedure but a fundamental right designed to secure a fair trial to a criminal defendant. See Note, Inculpatory Statements Against PenalInterest and the Confrontation
Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 183-84 (1983). Thus, in order to ensure a fair trial for the
defendant, courts must require that the "evidence used to prove a defendant's guilt meet a
greater standard of reliability than that which. . .would show his innocence." Id. at 184.
9 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). When the witness against the
defendant is his codefendant, that codefendant may not be required to take the stand. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
10 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968). In Bruton, a joint trial resulted in the convictions of both the defendant and the codefendant. Id. at 124. A witness
had been allowed to testify that the codefendant orally confessed committing the crime with
the defendant. Id. The trial judge advised the jury that this testimony was not to be used in
assessing the defendant's guilt. Id. at 125. On appeal, the codefendant's conviction was set
aside on the grounds that the oral confession should not have been admitted, but the conviction of the defendant was affirmed in light of the jury instructions. Id. at 124-25. The
Bruton court determined that since the defendant could not cross-examine his codefendant,
limiting instructions to the jury was not an "adequate substitute for [the] petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination" because the hearsay evidence would have a "devastating" effect on his case. Id. at 137. Since a 'substantial risk' existed that the jury could be
influenced by the extrajudicial statement of the codefendant, id. at 126, adding 'substantial
weight' to the prosecutor's case against the defendant, id. at 128, the Court ruled that severance was required. Id. at 137.
11 See Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion); People v. Berzups, 49
N.Y.2d 417, 425, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1158, 426 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256-57 (1980); People v. Mc Neil,
24 N.Y.2d 550, 552, 249 N.E.2d 383, 384, 301 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504, cert. denied 396 U.S. 937
(1969). But see infra note 40 (Parker dissent argued interlocking exception to Bruton
should be rejected).
In his concurring opinion to Parker,Justice Blackmun, pointing out that the plurality
never defined interlocking confessions, stated:
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the new approach mandates even an inquiry
whether the confessions interlock. . . .The principal opinion. . .simply assumes
the interlock. It thus comes close to saying that so long as all the defendants have
made some type of confession which is placed in evidence, Bruton is inapplicable
without inquiry into whether the confessions actually interlock and the extent
thereof.
Parker,442 U.S. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). One author has interpreted the Parker
plurality as holding such a test to be that so long as both defendants have confessed, one
need not inquire as to whether the confessions interlock in order to avert a Bruton violation.
See Dawson, supra note 2, at 1421.
In New York, however, confessibns "interlock" if they are "almost identical," see Mc
Neil, 24 N.Y.2d at 552, 249 N.E.2d at 383-84, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 504, or "substantially simi-
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pie v. Cruz and People v. Brims,12 two cases consolidated on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts' refusal to
grant separate trials, holding that confessions are interlocking if
they are substantially similar as to their content,
"regardless of
13
differences in their comparative reliability.'
In Cruz, the defendant and his brother, the codefendant, were
4
jointly indicted for the felony murder of a gas station attendant.
A third accomplice was the victim of a suspected homicide five
months after the felony murder. 5 The brother of the dead accomplice suspected the defendant and the codefendant of that latter
crime. 6 He informed the authorities during the investigation of his
brother's homicide that both the defendant and the codefendant
had confessed their role in the earlier crime to him.' 7 Subsequently, in a 22 minute video tape, the codefendant confessed to
the authorities that he and his brother had participated in the felony murder. 18 At trial, the dead accomplice's brother testified, implicating both defendants, and the codefendant's videotaped confession was received in evidence with proper limiting instructions. 9
lar." See People v. Smalls, 55 N.Y.2d 407, 415, 434 N.E.2d 1063, 1066, 449 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699
(1982); People v. Safian, 46 N.Y.2d 181, 184, 385 N.E.2d 1046, 1047, 413 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120
(1978), cert. denied 443 U.S. 912 (1979). A defendant's confession does not interlock with
his codefendant's if the codefendant's incriminating admission fills a material gap in the
People's evidence against the defendant. See Smalls, 55 N.Y.2d at 415, 434 N.E.2d at 1067,
449 N.Y.S.2d at 700; People v. Burns, 84 App. Div. 2d 845, 847, 444 N.Y.S.2d 671, 674 (2d
Dep't 1981) (mem.).
When interlocking confessions are introduced in evidence, Bruton does not apply. See
Parker,442 U.S. at 75. Since both defendants have confessed, the extrajudicial statement of
either cannot have the devastating effect upon the other that was feared in Bruton. See id.
at 73. Additionally, the defendant's right to cross-examine his codefendant is less valuable
to him since his own words inculpate him. See id. Lastly, the codefendant's confession is no
longer suspect when the defendant's own unchallenged statement corroborates it. See id.
12 66 N.Y.2d 61, 485 N.E.2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1985).
13 Id. at 65, 74, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 229, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16, 22.
14 See id. at 65, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
15 See id.
11 See id. at 75, 485 N.E.2d at 230, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
17 See id. at 65, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The brother of the dead accomplice informed the police that the defendant and codefendant had come to his home immediately following the crime, and that the defendant was wounded and had confessed to him
at that time. Id. The decedent's brother also claimed that the codefendant told him about
the crime, but in less detail than the defendant. Id. The defendant, however, denied confessing to the decedent's brother. People v. Cruz, 119 Misc. 2d 1080, 1082, 465 N.Y.S.2d 419,
421 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1983).
See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 66, 71, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16, 20.
" See id. at 66, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The People also offered police
testimony, forensic evidence, photographs establishing the crime and medical evidence of
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The defendant did not offer any evidence.20
In Brims, three accomplices were indicted for multiple charges
arising out of a burglary and related homicides. 21 The defendant
confessed to two lay individuals: his cousin, who had driven to and
from the crime scene but was never charged as an accomplice, and
a prisoner, whom the defendant had met while incarcerated for an
unrelated crime.2 2 Both the cousin and the prisoner testified at the
trial. 23 The homicide victim's daughter, a codefendant who had as-

sisted in the preparation for the crimes but was not present when
they actually occurred, confessed to the police that she had unlocked the door to her parents' home so that the other two accomplices could burglarize it. 24 This confession was entered in evidence

against her at the trial. 5 None of the defendants took the stand.26
In both cases, the defendants' motions for severance prior to
trial were denied. In each case the defendants were tried jointly
with their codefendants and subsequently found guilty.28 Both de-

cisions were affirmed without opinion.29 The defendants urged reversal claiming, inter alia, that the content of their confessions did
not "interlock" with those of their codefendants and that even if
they did, the codefendants' confessions made to the police were
more reliable, thus more credible, than their own alleged confessions made to individuals having motives to lie.30 The defendants
the bullet's trajectory, thus corroborating the evidence contained in the confessions. See id.
at 66, 485 N.E.2d at 223,495 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
20See id. at 66, 485 N.E.2d at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
21 See id. at 67, 485 N.E.2d at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
22 See id. at 67-68, 485 N.E.2d at 224-25, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18.
23 See id.

See id. at 67, 485 N.E.2d at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
25 See id. There was substantial corroborating evidence against the defendant: blood
stains found in the cousin's car supported his testimony with respect to the defendant; the
ski mask and the gun used during the perpetration of the crime were found in the place the
cousin had indicated; the blood found on the defendant's sneakers was of the same rare
blood type as one of the victims and the defendant tried to establish an alibi that his own
witness failed to support. Id. at 67-68, 485 N.E.2d at 225, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
26 See id. at 67, 485 N.E.2d at 224, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
21 See id. at 64, 485 N.E.2d at 222, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 15. The defendant in Cruz was
given leave to renew his motions at the termination of the trial evidence; the motion was
once more denied. People v. Cruz, 119 Misc. 2d 1080, 1082, 465 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1983).
28 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 64, 485 N.E.2d at 222, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
29 See People v. Cruz, 104 App. Div. 2d 1060, 481 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st Dep't 1984); People
v. Brims, 105 App. Div. 2d 1164, 482 N.Y.S.2d 406 (2d Dep't 1984).
20 Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 64, 485 N.E.2d at 222, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (1985). Cruz argued
that he was entitled to a reversal because he was denied a fair trial, as applied in New York
24
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argued that, under those circumstances, the jurors must have improperly used the codefendants' reliable confessions to resolve any
doubts about the defendants' guilt.3
In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that reliability would
not be considered to determine whether confessions interlocked."
Judge Simons, writing for the court, noted that to be interlocking,
confessions had to be substantially similar as to their content and
could not fill material gaps in the proof against the defendant.33
Thus, the court found that the two sets of confessions interlocked.3 4 As to the reliability issue, Judge Simons noted that the
courts. See id. at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 228, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 21. The fair trial standard is violated when a codefendant's admission fills material gaps in the prosecutor's case against the
defendant resulting in "the impairment of substantial rights." People v. Payne, 35 N.Y.2d
22, 27-28, 315 N.E.2d 762, 765-66, 358 N.Y.S.2d 701, 706-07 (1974). Nevertheless, when sufficient independent evidence exists to warrant the jury's determination, the defendant is not
denied a fair trial. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 228, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (citing
People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 426, 164 N.E.2d 336, 338 (1928)). The court concluded that
the defendant was not denied a fair trial since the evidence against him was independent of
his codefendant's admissions. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 228, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
In Brims, the defendant claimed that he was prejudiced because he was denied the
right to call his codefendant to the stand. Id. at 73, 485 N.E.2d at 228, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
There was, however, no evidence to show that the codefendant would testify on the defendant's behalf nor that the testimony would tend to exculpate the defendant. See id. To warrant severance, the defendant must not only show that he intends to call the codefendant as
a witness, but that he reasonably needs to do so. See People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 93, 98, 238
N.E.2d 715, 718, 291 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (1968); People v. Vilialobos, 108 App. Div. 2d 887,
887, 485 N.Y.S.2d 382, 382 (2d Dep't 1985)(mem.); People v. Kampshoff, 53 App. Div. 2d
325, 339, 385 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (4th Dep't 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1978).
Brim's final contention was that the defendants' antagonistic defenses mandated severance. See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 73, 485 N.E.2d at 229, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 22. In antagonistic
defense cases, severance is required only if a joint trial is unfairly prejudicial and "substantially impairs" the defendant's defense. Id.; see People v. La Belle, 18 N.Y.2d 405, 409, 222
N.E.2d 727, 729, 276 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108 (1966); Dawson, supra note 2, at 1422-25.
" Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 64, 485 N.E.2d at 222, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
32 See id. at 65, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The Court noted that in prior
decisions confessions had been found to interlock although one was oral and the other written, see id. at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (citing People v. Woodward, 50
N.Y.2d 922, 923, 409 N.E.2d 926, 926, 431 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (1980) (mem.), and although
one was short and the other long. See id. (citing People v. Safian, 46 N.Y.2d 181, 189, 385
N.E.2d 1046, 1050, 413 N.Y.S.2d 118, 123 (1978)). Judge Simons also observed that the Second Circuit had concluded that confessions interlocked even though one was made to the
authorities while the other was addressed to lay individuals. See id. (citing Tamilio v. Fogg,
713 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1983)).
33 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 70, 485 N.E.2d at 226, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20.
" See id. at 71, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20. The Court found that the Cruz
confessions coincided as to time, place, participants, motive and essential facts and that the
codefendant's longer statement did not contradict or alter the defendant's admission. See
id. As to Brims, the Court noted that the content of the confessions was "markedly different" because the codefendant was not present during the commission of the crime. See id.
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court had already rejected the contention that a confession's unreliability should defeat its interlocking nature 5 and that the Supreme Court had indicated a tolerance for differences in the reliability of confessions. 3s The court concluded that the defendants' confessions were not unreliable as a matter of law and that the credi37
bility issue properly required a jury's determination.
In her dissent, limited to the Cruz case, Judge Kaye maintained that the codefendant's confession added substantial weight
to the prosecutor's case against the defendant, in contravention of
his sixth amendment rights.38 Furthermore, the dissent argued that
the confessions should not have been found to interlock since material gaps in the proof against the defendant, as to credibility,
Nevertheless, to the extent that the codefendant had knowledge of the crime, her statement
interlocked with the two confessions made by the defendant. See id.
11 See id. at 71, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20. The court cited People v. Woodward, 50 N.Y.2d 922, 923, 409 N.E.2d 926, 926, 431 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (1980), as authority
for rejecting a consideration of the reliability of a confession when determining its interlocking nature. See id. The Woodward Court, however, determined: "[t]hat a defendant's confession was oral while that of his codefendant was written is a factor to be considered...
but by itself is not enough to make the [Bruton] rule rather than the [McNeil] exception
apply." 50 N.Y.2d at 923, 409 N.E.2d at 926, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (emphasis added). It is
submitted that the reliability issue was considered in Woodward and that the Cruz Court,
by enunciating a per se rule that reliability would not be considered, has altered the holding
of its cited authority.
'6 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20. In Parkerv. Randolph, the dissent raised the possibility of unreliable confessions. See 442 U.S. 62, 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Cruz court determined therefore that because "differences in the
scope and reliability of the confessions" had been "anticipated," the Supreme Court's acceptance of interlocking confessions indicated that such differences would be "tolerated." 66
N.Y.2d at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20. It is submitted that the issue of reliability was not before the Parker Court; thus, the Court's decision not to address this matter
in dictum should not be construed to signify that unreliable confessions would be "tolerated." "The Supreme Court has not definitely settled the issue of the admissibility of codefendants' interlocking confessions when neither testifies at trial." Delaney, supra note 8, at
669. See also Marcus, The Confrontation Clause and Co-defendant Confessions: The Drift
from Bruton to Parker v. Randolph, 1979 U. ILL. LF. 559, 588 (Parkerplurality left many
questions unanswered). One author has commented that the Court should "apply the Confrontation Clause to find error whenever a non-testifying co-defendant's statement implicates a defendant." Id. at 590.
37 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 72, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20; see also People v.
Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696, 702, 249 N.E.2d 747, 749, 301 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1969) (jury findings not disturbed unless incredible as matter of law or insufficient evidence). But see infra
note 41 and accompanying text (this author's view that when codefendant's damaging statement in evidence, jury determination of credibility issue a sham).
" Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 74-75, 485 N.E.2d at 229-30, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 22 (Kaye, J., dissenting); see also supra note 8-10 and accompanying text (sixth amendment right of confrontation violated if codefendant's confession adds substantial weight to case against defendant and defendant denied opportunity to cross-examine codefendant).
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were inevitably filled by impermissible reference to the codefendant's confession.39
The constitutional right of confrontation was restricted in interlocking confession cases because impeaching one's codefendant
was viewed as less crucial when the defendant's "own admission of
guilt [stood] before the jury unchallenged. 4 0 When a confession is
contested, however, it is submitted that its reliability should be
considered in determining whether it "interlocks" with another
confession. The defendant's right to cross examine the witness, to
whom he allegedly confessed, is rendered meaningless in a joint
trial because the jury may impermissibly refer to the codefendant's
confession to resolve doubts about the defendant's guilt which may
have arisen upon cross-examination. 4' Thus the credibility issue is
in effect wrested from the jury's determination. It is submitted
that in such a situation the defendant is effectively denied the
right to impeach both the testifying witness and the nontestifying
codefendant. Therefore, if there is a substantial possibility that the
defendant never made the extrajudicial admission and there is no
other direct evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is
suggested that the confessions should not be found to interlock,
and severance should be granted.
In Brims, it is suggested that had the reliability of the defendant's confessions been considered, it would not have defeated their
interlocking nature because (1) there was overwhlming evidence
11 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 75, 485 N.E.2d at 229, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 22 (Kaye, J., dissenting); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (codefendant's confession does not interlock with defendant's if it fills material gaps in proof against defendant).
40 Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979). See supra note 11 and accompanying
text (rationale of Parker plurality). The dissent in Parker rejected the interlocking exception to Bruton arguing that evidence of an extrajudicial confession "is not an acceptable
reason for depriving [a defendant] of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him." Parker,442 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "[a] defendant's
decision to confess does not necessarily imply a relinquishment of his right to cross-examine
an accuser. Although he may vitiate the value of that right by confessing, the decision to
exercise the right, no matter how futile, should be left to the defendant's discretion." Note,
Evidence: the Right of Confrontationand the Admission of Interlocking Confessions at a
Joint Trial, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1591, 1606 (1980).
41 A defendant has the right to challenge his own confession, but when other confessions are admitted in evidence, the jury may conclude all are true. People v. McNeil, 24
N.Y.2d 550, 556, 249 N.E.2d 383, 386, 301 N.Y.S.2d 503, 507, (Fuld, C.J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 937 (1969). For a jury to expunge from their minds the evidence against
the codefendant when determining the guilt of the defendant is "the recommendation to the
jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
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corroborating the confessions; 42 (2) the codefendant's confession
merely described the preparation to the crimes, 43 thus it could not
add substantial weight to the evidence against the defendant; and
(3) the witnesses testifying against the defendant could not have
known the details of the crimes independently of the defendant's
own inculpatory words since there was no allegation the other two
accomplices had ever revealed those details to the witnesses.
In Cruz, however, it is submitted that judicial consideration of
the reliability issue would have led to the determination that the
confessions did not interlock and that the defendant was entitled
to a separate trial. Since the testimony of the witness to whom the
defendant allegedly confessed was the only direct evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, 44 its credibility was of paramount importance. Yet credibility was directly in issue because the
testifying witness had a strong motive to fabricate the confession
and because he could have discovered the details of the crime
without the defendant's alleged admission.4 5 It is submitted that
the jury could not properly assess the weight to be accorded this
testimony once the codefendant's video taped confession was admitted in evidence.
A judicial hypothesis about a defendant's probable guilt after
viewing the totality of admissible and inadmissible evidence should
not justify denying a defendant his substantive rights to a fair
trial. The integrity of the legal system must be maintained, not
merely to assure "bad men" a fair trial, but to ensure that the innocent might go free. A per se rule that confessions whose content
42 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 68, 485 N.E.2d at 225, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 18; see also supra

notes 19, 25. (specifyint corroborative evidence).
43 See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 71, 485 N.E.2d at 227, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 20. See supra notes
24-25 and accompanying text.
" See Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d at 75, 485 N.E.2d at 229, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 22-23 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
"I The witness waited five months before reporting the confession to the police. Id. at
65, 485 N.E.2d at 223, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 16. He had a compelling motive to harm the defendant in as much as he believed the defendant to be his brother's murderer. See id. at 75, 485
N.E.2d at 230, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 23 (Kaye, J., dissenting). Under oath the witness testified
that he did not know how his brother, who resided with him, earned his living, yet he explained his five month silence by saying that his brother was a participant in the crime. Id.
It is submitted that since the witness could have learned of the details of the crime independently of the defendant - his brother or the defendant's brother could have revealed them
to him - the confession may very well have been a fabrication.
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is substantially similar interlock, regardless of their comparative
reliability, is antithetical to that end.
Etty Menache Pollack

PENAL LAW

Penal Law § 265.02(4): Criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree-defendant bears burden of production as to "home
or place of business" exception
Under section 265.02(4) of the Penal Law,1 a person possessing
a loaded firearm is guilty of a class D felony, unless "such possession takes place in such person's home or place of business."2 New
York courts have held that the home or place of business exception
I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980). Section 265.02 provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when:
(4) He possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession shall not. . . constitute
a violation of this section if such possession, takes place in such person's home or
place of business.
Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is a class D felony.
Id.. Mere possession of a firearm, regardless of whether it is loaded or where it is possessed
is a class A misdemeanor. See § 265.01(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The exception for possession of a
loaded firearm in one's home or place of business reflects a conscious effort to balance society's need to restrict illegal weapons and the individual's need to protect himself and his
property. See People v. Rondon, 109 Misc. 2d 394, 395, 439 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1981); People v. McWilliams, 96 Misc. 2d 648, 651, 653-54, 409 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612,
614 (Nassau County Ct. 1978). Courts have generally applied the place of business exception
when a defendant's personal property interests are at stake. See, e.g., People v. Santana, 77
Misc. 2d 414, 415, 354 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1974) (taxicab is
driver's place of business); People v. Anderson, 74 Misc. 2d 415, 419, 344 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1973) (same). But see People v. Levine, 42 App. Div. 2d
769, 769, 346 N.Y.S.2d 756, 756 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.) (exception inapplicable when taxidriver unnecessarily brandished loaded gun in argument with another motorist).
Courts will not apply the place of business exception if possession of the weapon is
incidental or irrelevant to legitimate protection of property. See, e.g., People v. Fearon, 58
App. Div. 2d 1041, 1041, 397 N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (4th Dep't 1977) (mem.) (where defendant
shot co-worker, exception did not apply merely because shooting occurred at place of emplpyment), People v. Francis, 45 App. Div. 2d 431, 434, 358 N.Y.S.2d 148, 152 (2d Dep't
1974) (United States postal worker could not take advantage of exception where he was not
required by his superiors to protect government property), aff'd on other grounds, 38
N.Y.2d 150, 341 N.E.2d 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1975); People v. Rondon, 109 Misc. 2d 394,
399, 439 N.Y.S.2d 803, 808 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (director of not-for-profit corporation does not fall within exception unless authorized by corporate employer to carry
weapon).

